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ABSTRACT
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided
between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional
knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of
ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity
view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to
generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the
intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the
anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view
combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 15 May 2017; Revised 16 January 2018
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1. Introduction
Knowing-how seems to be a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. Yet, according to
the standard semantics for knowledge-how ascriptions, to be truly said to know how to
do something requires standing in a relation to a proposition about how to do it. Intel-
lectualists about knowledge-how typically take their lead from the semantics of knowl-
edge-how ascriptions, claiming that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional
knowledge. As a consequence, they have trouble explaining the practical properties
of knowledge-how. By contrast, anti-intellectualists typically give priority to the practical
properties of knowledge-how, claiming that knowledge how is a kind of ability. Since
abilities are typically relations to activities rather than to propositions, anti-intellectualists
have the parallel problem of making their view compatible with linguistic theory.
In this paper, I explore a novel compromise position: the interrogative capacity view.
According to this view, knowledge how to do something is a certain kind of ability to
generate answers to the question of how to do it. I argue that combining a propositional
object with an abilitative relation makes the view uniquely well-placed to defuse the ten-
sion between semantic theory and the practicality of knowledge-how, and allows it to
illuminate the relation between knowledge-how, propositional knowledge, and abilities.
2. Logical Space
In thinking about logical space in the knowledge-how debate, we need to carefully dis-
tinguish claims about the object of knowledge-how from claims about the nature of the
knowledge-how relation.
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Glick [2011: 407–11] points out that the claim that knowledge-how is a species of
propositional knowledge can be understood in two ways:
Weak Intellectualism. Know-how is knowledge that has a proposition as a relatum.
Strong Intellectualism. Know-how is knowledge that has a proposition as a relatum,
and involves the theoretical knowledge relation.
Weak intellectualism just claims that the object of knowledge-how is a proposition. By
contrast, Strong intellectualism involves the claim that the object of knowledge-how is
a proposition, and the claim that the relation is the same theoretical knowledge relation
found in knowing that p.1 Although strong intellectualism entails weak intellectualism,
the converse entailment does not hold [ibid.: 412–15].
Intellectualism is generally motivated by appealing to the semantics for interrogative
complements (like ‘how to swim’) which claim that an interrogative complement
expresses a question, which is identiﬁed with a set of possible answering propositions
[Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Glick 2011: 402–5].2 This means
that the default weak intellectualist view is that knowledge how to V is a relation to a
proposition that answers the question how to V?
Weak intellectualism is compatible with views that claim that the knowledge-how
relation is something other than theoretical knowledge, although presumably it must
be a knowledge-constituting relation. For example, one might think that knowledge-
how is a distinctively practical knowledge relation to the question how to V? [Glick
2011; Cath 2015].
The anti-intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is not a species of propositional
knowledge can also be understood in two ways:
Weak Anti-Intellectualism. Know-how involves a relation other than theoretical
knowledge.
Strong Anti-Intellectualism. Know-how involves a relation other than theoretical
knowledge, and has a non-propositional relatum.
Weak anti-intellectualism is the claim that the knowledge-how relation is something
other than theoretical knowledge. Strong anti-intellectualism endorses both the claim
that the relation is a non-theoretical one, and the claim that the object is something
other than a proposition. As with intellectualism, strong anti-intellectualism entails
weak anti-intellectualism, but the converse entailment does not hold.
Anti-intellectualist positions encompass various non-propositional objects and non-
theoretical relations. For example, Bengson and Moffett’s Objectualist view is strongly
anti-intellectualist, claiming that knowing how involves bearing the understanding
1 There is considerable disagreement about what these properties are; but, to ﬁx the idea, one can think of theo-
retical knowledge as JTB+. Complicating things, arguments for intellectualism might motivate a revisionary
account of theoretical knowledge [Stalnaker 2012].
2 Interrogatives are a kind of sentence or clause (on par with declaratives), and questions are the things
expressed by interrogatives (on par with propositions). I will put quotes around interrogatives and I will italicize
questions. In the main text, I will not distinguish between the object of knowledge-how being a proposition or a
question (see note 17).
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relation to a way of acting [2011b].3 However, the most common view is that knowing
how is an ability. The simplest version of this view identiﬁes knowing how to V with
the ability to V, but there are alternatives. Craig [1990: 150–61]suggests identifying
knowledge-how with the ability to teach others; Setiya [2008, 2011] identiﬁes it with
the ability to enact intentions; L€owenstein [2017] identiﬁes it with the ability to do well
guided by understanding; and Ryle [2009: 30–3] identiﬁes it with an ability to act intel-
ligently (see Hornsby [2011: 81–2]).4 All of these views are strongly anti-intellectualist,
identifying knowledge-how with an ability that relates to something non-propositional.
With that said, by itself the claim that knowledge-how is a species of ability concerns
only the knowledge-how relation, yielding weak anti-intellectualism.
Putting together the strong and weak versions of each view gives us the following
space of views:
Table 1: Logical space in the knowledge-how debate
Object
Propositional Non-Propositional
Relation Theoretical knowledge Strong intellectualism —5
Something other than theoretical
knowledge
Weak intellectualism; weak anti-
intellectualism
Strong anti-
intellectualism
My goal in this paper is to explore a view that combines the weak anti-intellectualist
claim that knowledge-how is a kind of ability with the weak intellectualist claim that
knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions that answer the question how to V?
According to the interrogative capacity view, knowing how to V is one’s standing in a cer-
tain kind of ability-to-answer relation to the question how to V? This view is not
completely novel: Masto [2010] and Farkas [2016a, 2016b] defend related views of knowl-
edge-wh, Michaelis [2011: 278] suggests this view of knowledge-how in passing, and Dickie
[2012] and Stanley and Williamson [2016] develop related views of skill (see section 5.3.).
However, to my knowledge, no one has worked out this view of knowledge-how in detail.
3. The Interrogative Capacity View
Knowledge-how is not identical with just any ability to answer a how-to question.
Someone who has read a book on skiing is in a sense able to answer the question of
how to ski, but we don’t want to say that they thereby know how to ski (at least in the
practical sense). Just as the simple ability view faces the challenge of isolating the kind
of ability to V that is relevant to knowledge-how and a strongly intellectualist view
needs to isolate the relevant kind of propositional knowledge, the interrogative capacity
view faces the challenge of isolating the relevant kind of ability to answer the question
3 Bengson and Moffett have an alternative taxonomy that focuses on the grounds of intelligence [2011a: 6–7,
14–15]. Although their view of knowledge-how is strongly anti-intellectualist in my terms, they claim that it
remains intellectualist on the grounds of knowledge-how [2011b 162–3]. There is no simple mapping from views
about the nature of knowledge-how to views about the grounds of intelligence: Intellectualist views can claim
that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge that depends on ability (see section 5.3.), and anti-
intellectualist views can claim that knowledge-how involves a non-propositional relation that relies on proposi-
tional knowledge [Wiggins 2012; Kremer 2017; L€owenstein 2017].
4 On Ryle’s positive view, see Elzinga [2016], Kremer [2017], and L€owenstein [2017: 13–46].
5 Can knowledge-how involve a theoretical knowledge relation, but a non-propositional object? The closest
thing to this kind of view is Brogaard [2011], which understands knowledge-how as a relation to a property,
involving a relation with JTB-type properties.
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how to V? I will use the notion of an ability to answer questions on the ﬂy to pick out
the kind of ability that I identify with knowledge-how. To unpack this idea, I will give
accounts of (i) how to understand answering, (ii) relevant how-to questions, (iii) the
kinds of situations that are relevant to the ability, and (iv) the distinctive way in which
answers are produced.
3.1 Answers
There are various senses of ‘answer’. In a weak sense, one answers a question if one pro-
duces a possible answer, even if that answer is not correct. We can set this notion aside,
focusing on correct answers. We can also set partial answers to one side (see
Pavese [2017]). In another sense—what we might call the ‘quiz show’ sense—
producing a correct answer sufﬁces for answering, regardless of method. In this sense,
one can answer a question with a correct guess. We can also set this to one side, focus-
ing on the kind of answering that involves getting to the correct answer in the epistemi-
cally right way. I will gloss this as the ability to know answers, since knowing an answer
entails having got to the correct answer in the epistemically right (non-Gettiered, non-
lucky) way.6
Although in many cases an ability to know will be an ability to gain knowledge, I
want to allow that an ability to know might involve repeated exercise of a piece of
standing propositional knowledge. I might be able to answer the question what are the
4th roots of 16? in virtue of being able to follow an algorithm for ﬁnding nth roots. But I
might also have this ability in virtue of having standing knowledge that the 4th roots of
16 are 2, ¡2, 2i, and ¡2i. To cover both cases, we can understand an ability to know as
an ability to activate knowledge [Williamson 1990: 5–10], where activating knowledge
covers both learning a proposition, and exercising standing knowledge.
Being able to answer is an ability to be in a certain mental state, not an ability to
engage in a speech act. There are many cases of agents who know how to do something
but cannot verbally articulate answers to the question of how to do it. I want to say that
such agents can answer the question—in the sense relevant for the interrogative capac-
ity view—but cannot express their answers in speech. There are various reasons for this
inexpressibility. A climber who has learnt to scale a difﬁcult wall might be unable to
activate this knowledge without having the holds in front of her as a prompt. Even in
relevant situations, an agent might only be able to express their knowledge using a
demonstrative [Stanley and Williamson 2001: 428–9; Luntley 2009; L€owenstein 2017:
115–21]. I might only be able to express and communicate my knowledge of how to tie
a Cat’s paw knot by making one and saying ‘this is the way to tie it.’
There are also cases in which knowledge-how is accompanied by a disposition to
assert incorrect answers [Wallis 2008; Brownstein and Michaelson 2016]. For example,
skilled cricket players typically produce mistaken answers to the question how do you
catch a ball? when asked [Brownstein and Michaelson 2016: 2821–3], plausibly express-
ing false beliefs about the answer. Anticipating some of the ideas in section 3.4, I want
to say that in such cases agents have an ability to activate knowledge of answers to the
question of how to catch a cricket ball in catching a cricket ball, despite being disposed
to express incorrect answers in speech. Such cases involve conﬂict between the
6 On abilities to know, see Millar [2009], Miracchi [2015], and Kelp [2017].
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dispositions associated with knowledge-how and belief, but the disposition to assert
false answers does not undermine the ability to answer questions on the ﬂy (for a simi-
lar idea, see L€owenstein [2017: 187]).
3.2 Questions
Knowledge how concerns inﬁnitival how-to questions, of the kind expressed by a
clause like ‘how to swim?’ Although these interrogatives seem simple, they are vari-
ously ambiguous [Stanley and Williamson 2001: 419–30], with the sense relevant for
practical knowledge being something like ‘what is a way in which I could swim?’
Answers also come at different levels of granularity [Fridland 2013; Habgood-Coote
forthcoming], ranging from coarse-grained propositions like I can swim by splashing
about in the water to ﬁne-grained propositions that specify an exact technique for
swimming in a particular situation. To respect the connection between knowledge-
how and a capacity to react intelligently, I take an ability to answer on the ﬂy to
involve activating knowledge of extremely ﬁne-grained answers specifying a method
for a particular situation. These ﬁne-grained questions will often have many differ-
ent answers in different situations (consider how to dress fashionably?), but other
questions may receive very similar or even identical ﬁne-grained answers (consider
how to unlock your phone?).
3.3 Situations
Since knowledge-how is a kind of practical knowledge, I take an ability to answer on
the ﬂy to involve the ability to activate answers in a set of practical situations sup-
plied by context. I take a practical situation to be one in which the activity in ques-
tion is a real option. I introduce the element of context-sensitivity to explain the
shiftiness of knows-how ascriptions [Hawley 2003: 22]. For example, in a US context
in which only driving an automatic car is salient, someone who only knows how to
drive an automatic car will count as knowing how to drive, whereas in a UK context
in which both driving a manual and driving an automatic are conversationally
salient, only people who know how to drive both will count as knowing how to
drive. I take the context-sensitivity of ‘knows how’ ascriptions to stem from context-
sensitivity in the interrogative phrase ‘how to V?’ This interrogative phrase includes
a covert situation variable ﬁlled in by context, meaning that its underlying structure
is ‘how to V in {F1, F2 …}?’ In the above example, the US context provides a smaller
set of situations than the UK context does, meaning that in the US knowing how to
drive requires being able to generate answers in fewer practical situations than is
required in the UK.
Appealing to context-sensitivity allows us to deal with cases of agents who are able
to answer a question without knowing-how [Hawley 2003: 26; Riley 2017: 351; Hab-
good-Coote forthcoming]. Someone who is good at ﬁguring things out might be in a
position to work out how to ﬁx a dishwasher just by exercising their general engineer-
ing know-how. Do they know how to ﬁx a dishwasher? The contextualist can say: it
depends. If the salient set of practical situations allows sufﬁcient time to work out how
to ﬁx a dishwasher, someone who has general engineering know-how will count as
knowing how, because they are able to answer the question in salient situations. How-
ever, if the salient situations are time-restricted, someone with general know-how will
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not be able to answer the question in the relevant situations, meaning that they will not
count as knowing how.
3.4 Answering by Doing
There are various ways in which one can answer a question, such as by looking it up on
the internet, by thinking about it, or by asking someone else. I want to appeal to a dis-
tinctively action-oriented kind of answering: answering the question how to V? in the
process of V-ing.
Consider the way in which one might solve a difﬁcult mathematics problem. Although
it might be possible in some cases to just ‘see’ the method for solving a problem, the more
usual way is to work out how to solve it in the process of solving that very problem, either
by splitting the problem into a series of sub-problems, and solving those in turn, or by try-
ing out different techniques to see what sticks. I suggest that we should think of both see-
ing the answer and working through the problem as involving the exercise of an ability to
answer the question how can I solve this problem? In the former case, one engages in a
mental action in order to generate an answer, and then applies that knowledge in solving
the problem, meaning that it is easy to distinguish between the phases of answering and of
doing. In the latter case, one answers the question by getting going on with solving the
puzzle, meaning that one may not have knowledge of how to solve the puzzle until one
has almost solved it. In this case, it is difﬁcult to distinguish between the processes of doing
and of working out, meaning that it may be more appropriate to think of both as inter-
twined aspects of the same process. This kind of answering is discussed by Ryle, who says
[2009: 30] that a skilled mountaineer walking in difﬁcult conditions ‘is concomitantly
walking and teaching himself how to walk’, and stresses [1971] the importance of self-
teaching to intelligent activity.
The appeal to answering by doing means that an ability to answer a question on the
ﬂy is both an ability to activate knowledge and an ability to do, producing both a suc-
cessful action and an answer to a question (at least in good cases). The ability to answer
the question how to V? on the ﬂy is at the same time an ability to answer the question
how to V? by doing V, and an adverbial ability to V by answering the question how to
V? (on adverbial abilities, see Hyman [1999]).
In cases where the question has a range of ﬁne-grained answers, answering in doing
will involve learning new propositions through self-teaching. However, in the cases
where knowledge-how is constituted by standing knowledge, one may be able to answer
a question by doing in virtue of having a piece of standing knowledge together with the
ability to apply that proposition to action. One might know how to open a safe in virtue
of having standing knowledge that the code is 1234, and being able to apply that knowl-
edge in opening the safe. It is important to stress that, in this case, the ability to answer
the question of how to open the safe on the ﬂy is the combination of the ability to men-
tally activate knowledge of an answer and the ability to apply that answer to action.
Merely being able to think an answer to a question is not enough for knowing-how
(excepting cases of mental action where thinking the answer sufﬁces for performing the
activity).7
7 It is possible to exercise knowledge-how in imagining, or instructing others, but I take these cases to be non-
standard.
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3.5 Formulating the View
Putting together the different parts of the view, an ability to answer questions on the ﬂy
is an ability to activate ﬁne-grained knowledge of the answers to a question in a contex-
tually supplied set of practical situations, where one activates this knowledge by doing
the relevant kind of activity. Identifying knowledge-how with an ability to answer on
the ﬂy gives us the following account:
The Interrogative Capacity View. For any context c, subject S, and activity V, an
utterance of ‘S knows how to V’ (in its practical-knowledge ascribing sense) is true
in c iff c has associated with it a set of practically relevant situations {F1, F2, …},
and, for all (or at least most) Fi that are members of {F1, F2, …}, S has the capacity
to activate knowledge of a ﬁne-grained answer to the question, how to V in Fi?, in
the process of V-ing.
These conditions are formulated as an account of the truth conditions of ‘S knows how
to V’, to allow us to introduce the element of context-sensitivity. It is important to bear
in mind that we are only interested in the practical-knowledge ascribing sense of ‘S
knows how to V’, and these conditions are not intended to cover examples in which
sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ simply ascribe theoretical propositional
knowledge [Glick 2011: 426–9].
This view is both weakly intellectualist—because it claims that knowledge-how is a
relation to the set of propositions that answer how to V?—and weakly anti-intellectual-
ist—because it claims that the knowledge-how relation is an abilitative one. This means
that it occupies the compromise position on the bottom left of the table in section 2.
It is easiest to get a grip on the ability to answer questions on the ﬂy in the compli-
cated cases, like knowing how to solve a mathematics problem or knowing how to dress
fashionably. These cases typically involve (i) generating new knowledge to meet the sit-
uation, (ii) a ﬁne-grained question with many different answers, (iii) an ascription
made relative to a wide range of situations, (iv) and an intertwined process of learning
and of doing. However, I have stressed that this capacity can also be manifested in sim-
pler cases, such as knowing how to open a safe or knowing how to ﬁnd out what 2+2 is,
which might involve (i) exercising standing knowledge, (ii) ﬁne-grained questions with
the same answers, (iii) ascriptions made relative to a narrow range of situations, and
(iv) relatively distinct processes of activating and of applying knowledge. In these cases,
knowledge-how will consist in standing propositional knowledge of the answer to a
question, together with the ability to apply that answer in action [Lewis 1999: 288–9;
Snowdon 2004: 9, 12; Glick 2011: 427]. This means that strong intellectualism is along
the right lines for the simple cases, although, according to the interrogative capacity
view, knowledge-how requires both the possession of propositional knowledge, and the
ability to apply that knowledge in action.8 My suspicion is that the majority of the inter-
esting cases will involve complex characteristics, but I want to leave the door open for
simple cases.
8 The fact that this account appeals to standing propositional knowledge in simple cases does not make it
covertly intellectualist. Even strong anti-intellectualist accounts can appeal to knowledge-that [Hornsby 2005:
113–18; Wiggins 2012: 108–16; Tsai 2014; Weatherson 2017: 380].
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4. Beneﬁts of the Interrogative Capacity View
The interrogative capacity view has two key philosophical beneﬁts: it illuminates the
connections between knowing how, propositional knowledge, and the ability to do, and
it resolves the tension between linguistic evidence and the idea that knowledge-how is a
distinctively practical kind of knowledge.
4.1 Knowing-How, Knowing-That, and Ability
Although there is disagreement about the connections between knowing how to V,
propositional knowledge about how to V, and the ability to V, there is an emerging
consensus between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists that knowledge-how is asso-
ciated with both propositional knowledge and the ability to do. The interrogative
capacity predicts both connections.
According to this view, knowing how produces—and in some cases requires—
propositional knowledge. When someone who knows how to swim exercises their abil-
ity to generate answers to the question how to swim?, the result will be a piece of propo-
sitional knowledge about how to swim. This propositional knowledge may be transient,
demonstrative, and never consciously articulated, but at least some of the time it will
make its way into an agent’s standing knowledge. Also, since in the simple cases stand-
ing propositional knowledge is a part of knowing-how, this view predicts that in some
cases knowledge-that will be a precondition for knowing-how.
Identifying knowledge-how with an ability to answer a question on the ﬂy also pre-
dicts the connection between knowing how to V and being able to V. The ability to
answer on the ﬂy is an action-oriented ability that is exercised in both answering and
doing. I observed above that one way to think of the ability to answer on the ﬂy is as an
adverbial ability to V by answering the question of how to V. Because V-ing by answer-
ing the question of how to V entails V-ing, the ability to V by answering the question
entails the simple ability to V (so long as the meaning of ‘can’ does not shift: see section
5.1), meaning that this view predicts that knowledge-how entails ability.
4.2 The Tension between Linguistics and Practicality
The most important positive feature of the interrogative capacity view is its ability to
resolve the tension between linguistic evidence and the practicality of knowledge-how.
Most participants in the knowledge-how debate accept both of these claims:
Semantic Implementability. An adequate account of the nature of knowledge-how
must be compatible with a linguistically plausible account of the semantics of sen-
tences of the form ‘S knows how to V.’
Practicality. An adequate account of the nature of knowledge-how must vindicate
the sense in which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical kind of knowledge.
The claim that an account of knowledge-how ought to be semantically implementable
is motivated by the idea that an account of the nature of knowledge-how ought to be
answerable to the best account of the semantics of ‘knows how’ ascriptions provided by
linguists. If an account identiﬁes knowledge-how with a state that is not plausibly
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picked out by these sentences, then it has changed the subject and is no longer talking
about knowledge-how [Stanley 2011b: 130–49].
The idea that knowledge-how is distinctively practical is based on the intuition that
knowledge-how has distinctive properties that set it apart from other kinds of knowl-
edge. Knowledge-how appears to have the following properties:
Directness: knowing-how is exercised directly in intentional action, not via some
intermediate act of mental contemplation;
Flexibility: knowing-how involves an ability to react intelligently to a wide range of
situations;
Necessity: knowledge-how is a necessary condition for intentional action.9
There is a good deal of support for these properties, on both sides of the debate.10 To
explain the practicality of knowledge-how, an account of knowledge-how ought to be
able to explain why knowledge-how has these properties.
Given these two constraints, the challenge is to give an account of knowledge-how
that is both semantically implementable and can explain the practicality of knowledge-
how.
Intellectualists typically motivate their view by appealing to linguistics, appealing to
the fact that the standard semantic treatment for an interrogative complement like
‘how to V’ treats it as expressing a question, which is understood as a set of possible
answering propositions.11 This semantics is compatible with the strong intellectualist
view that knowledge-how is theoretical knowledge of a proposition that answers the
question how to V? However, strong intellectualism faces a challenge in explaining the
practicality of knowledge-how. In general, propositional knowledge does not seem to
be practical in the way that knowledge-how is, meaning that the burden of proof is on
intellectualists to explain how a species of theoretical knowledge could realise direct-
ness, ﬂexibility, and necessity.12 Stanley and Williamson claim that knowledge-how
involves a distinctively practical ﬁrst-person mode of presentation, relying on the
thought that, in general, ﬁrst-person thought has a distinctive connection with action
[Stanley and Williamson 2001: 429–30; Stanley 2011b: 109–10, 182–3]. However, critics
of intellectualism contend that the notion of a practical way of thinking is obscure
[Glick 2015], and the debate about the legitimacy of practical modes of presentation is
on-going.13
Anti-intellectualists typically motivate their view by appealing to one or more of the
practical features of knowledge-how, the idea being that abilities have the right kind of
9 There is controversy about how to formulate the necessity claim [Setiya 2008, 2012; Stanley 2011b: 188–90],
and about whether it applies to basic action (see L€owenstein [2017: 29–34]).
10 On directness, see Ryle [2009: 17–20] and Stanley [2011b: 1–35]; on ﬂexibility, see Ryle [1976], Hornsby [2011:
89–95], Stanley [2011b: 181–5], Wiggins [2012: 97–106], and Fridland [2013]; and, on necessity, see Setiya [2008,
2012], Stanley and Williamson [2001: 415–16, 432–3], Stanley [2011b: 188–90], and Hornsby [2016: 8–10].
11 At least on Groenendijk and Stokhof’s account [1984] and for Stanley [2011a: 36–69]. Stanley and Williamson
[2001] appeal to a Karttunen-style treatment that identiﬁes questions with true answers. For simplicity, I stay with
the former account.
12 To be fair, intellectualists might be able to explain directness, by arguing that all knowledge is exercised directly
in action [Stanley 2011b: 1–35].
13 I think that Pavese’s [2015] version of strong intellectualism is best positioned to take on the challenge of
explaining Practicality. However, her view is complex, and reasons of space prevent me from discussing it here.
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properties to explain the practicality of knowledge-how.14 However, the simple ability
theory faces a serious challenge in explaining the linguistic data. The strong anti-intel-
lectualist view that knowing how to V is identical to the ability to V claims that the
object of knowledge-how is an activity, meaning that they need a semantics for ‘knows
how’ ascriptions that treats the complement as an activity-expressing inﬁnitival phrase.
It is true that ‘knows how’ ascriptions involve an inﬁnitival phrase, but the only way to
get this phrase as the complement of ‘knows’ is by claiming that ‘knows-how’ forms a
constituent—giving the structure (S [knows how] [to V])—which is implausible on
syntactic grounds [Stanley and Williamson 2001: 417–18].15
I cannot hope to show that all extant views of knowledge-how fall into one of these
two traps.16 My aim is to show that the tension between these two kinds of evidence
animates the debate, and that the two best-known views fail to resolve it. Each view
gets something right, but faces an important problem.
The interrogative capacity view does better by combining the element of intellectual-
ism that makes it semantically implementable with the element of anti-intellectualism
that explains the practicality of knowledge-how. As Glick [2011] points out, the linguis-
tic evidence to which intellectualists appeal concerns only the semantics of the ‘how to’
complement, meaning that it only gets us to the weak intellectualist claim that the
object of knowledge-how is a proposition. This means that any view that identiﬁes the
object of knowledge-how with the set of propositions that answer a how-to question
can be implemented using the standard semantics for interrogative complements. Since
the interrogative capacity view makes just such a commitment, it can be semantically
implemented.17 The interrogative capacity view can treat a sentence like ‘Jane knows
how to swim’ by claiming that the interrogative ‘how to swim’ expresses a question,
and combining this with the claim that in this case the verb ‘knows’ expresses a distinc-
tively practical relation—the ability to answer on the ﬂy.18
The basic idea behind the anti-intellectualist strategy for explaining the practical
character of knowledge-how is to identify knowledge-how with a species of ability.
Standardly, this strategy appeals to the strong anti-intellectualist view that knowledge
how to V is the ability to V. However, the claim that knowledge-how is a species of abil-
ity only really gets us to the weak anti-intellectualist claim that the knowledge-how
14 See Ryle [1945, 2009] for an appeal to directness; Ryle [1976], Hornsby [2011], Wiggins [2012], and Fridland
[2013] for appeals to ﬂexibility; and Setiya [2008, 2012] for an appeal to necessity.
15 An important caveat. Some languages—such as French and Russian—employ a simple inﬁnitival construction
to ascribe knowledge-how. One way in which the simple ability-theorist could try to implement her view is by
advancing a revisionary semantics for English based on French and Russian. This move reverses Stanley’s strategy
for dealing with French [2011b: 135–43].
16 Objectualist views might be thought to escape this dilemma; but see Habgood-Coote [2017] for an argument
that objectualism is not semantically implementable.
17 Whereas some attitudes—like wondering and inquiring—might be thought to be attitudes to questions, but
not to their answering propositions [Friedman 2013], on the interrogative capacity view, knowledge-how involves
both a relation to a question (the ability to answer relation) and a relation to a true answering proposition (the
ability to know relation).
18 An alternative way to implement this view would be to appeal to genericity. Some knowledge-how ascriptions
appear to be habituals [Pavese 2016: 656–7]. Consider the sentence ‘Elsa knows how to calm people down’, which
seems to express the generalization that, in most situations in which some person needs to be calmed down, Elsa
knows how to calm down that person. If the habitual reading expresses an ability to know, then this reading could
also be used to implement the view that knowledge-how is an ability to know. However, I ﬁnd the claim that all
practical knowledge-ascribing sentences have a habitual reading linguistically implausible (see Waights Hickman
[manuscript]). With that said, the interrogative capacity view is in a good position to explain the cases in which
the habitual reading is available.
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relation is something other than theoretical knowledge, and identifying knowledge-how
with the ability to answer questions on the ﬂy does a pretty good job of explaining
directness, ﬂexibility, and necessity.
The idea that knowledge-how is exercised directly in action is explained by the fact
that answering a question on the ﬂy involves answering a question by engaging in the
relevant activity. On this view, if I know how to dance, then I can exercise directly, in
dancing, the capacity to answer questions about how to dance.
We can also explain the ﬂexibility of knowledge-how by appealing to the fact that, in
complex cases, a capacity to answer questions on the ﬂy will produce different answers
to meet the needs of the situation. Whereas intellectualists identify knowing how to do
something with a ﬁxed body of propositional knowledge, on the interrogative capacity
view knowledge-how is identiﬁed with an ability to generate an expanding set of situa-
tion-speciﬁc propositional knowledge. Following Ryle, someone who exercises her
knowledge-how to answer a question is very often both doing and learning.
The interrogative capacity view also explains the connection between knowledge-
how and intentional action. It is natural to think that forming an intention involves
answering a question—a question about what to do. I think that it is plausible that, in
virtue of answering a question about what to do, the act of forming an intention also
raises various other questions. For example, if I form the intention to go for a run
today, thereby resolving the question of what to do today, I will raise the further ques-
tions of where to run and what time to start.19 Among the questions raised in forming
the intention to V is the question of how to V? I want to suggest that we think of inten-
tionally V-ing as involving answering the question of how to V. This would seem a little
strange if we thought that answering a question involved a speech act, or conscious
consideration, but one of the lessons of section 3 is that we can stretch the notion of
answering, allowing it to cover various practical relations. If intentional action involves
answering a how-to question, then it is natural to think that the standard case of inten-
tional action involves exercising an ability to answer, since answering a question
involves the ability to answer (just as acting involves the ability to act).
By combining the weak intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a relation to a
question with the weak anti-intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of abil-
ity, the interrogative capacity view is in a good position to offer an account that is
semantically implementable and that explains the practicality of knowledge-how. This
gives it an advantage over both strong intellectualism and strong anti-intellectualism.
5. Criticism and Responses
5.1 Being Able to Do, and Being Able to Answer on the Fly
Views that identify knowing how with an ability to answer a question face a dilemma.
Either the ability to answer a question entails the ability to do, or it does not. If it does,
counterexamples to the claim that knowledge-how entails ability will challenge whether
the ability to answer is necessary for knowing-how. If the entailment does not hold,
then one might worry that there will be cases of agents who are able to answer the ques-
tion of how to V but not able to employ those answers in action [Weatherson 2017],
raising the concern that having the ability to answer a question is not sufﬁcient for
19 This idea is closely related to Bratman’s claim [1987: 29–30] that intentions are partial plans. For an account of
partial plans in terms of questions, see Snedegar [manuscript].
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knowing how. Since the ability to answer a question on the ﬂy entails the ability to act,
the interrogative capacity view takes the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma, meaning that it is
incumbent on a support of this view to offer a response to putative cases of knowledge-
how without ability.
My preferred response to these cases appeals to the context-sensitivity of ability
ascriptions. According to the interrogative capacity view, knowing how to V is identical
to an ability to generate answers to the question of how to V in all (or at least most) of
a contextually salient set of practical situations. This means that the truth of ‘knows
how’ ascriptions depends on the salient set of situations. It is independently plausible
that ability ascriptions such as ‘S can V’ are context-sensitive, roughly making a claim
like in one/most/all of the contextually supplied set of worlds, S Vs [Glick 2012]. This
means that, according to the interrogative capacity view, the claim that know-how
entails ability links two context-sensitive expressions. To assess this conditional, we
need to be careful to hold context ﬁxed to avoid apparent counterexamples that are due
to context-shifts.20 I want to suggest that putative counterexamples of knowledge-how
without ability involve context shifts, and that, when we hold context ﬁxed, the entail-
ment does go through.
Consider a standard example of someone who putatively knows how without being
able to do. Juliet is an experienced cyclist who has just had a serious accident that causes
her to lose both of her legs. In this case, it would be natural to assert both (1) and (2):
(1) Juliet knows how to cycle.
(2) Juliet cannot cycle.
My suggestion is that our acceptance of this pair of claims stems from a shift in the set
of worlds under consideration, and that, once we hold this ﬁxed, know-how and ability
claims stand or fall together. Following Hawley [2003], I suggest that the default set of
worlds associated with a knowledge-how ascription like (1) is the set of ‘normal’ worlds,
in which Juliet has both of her legs. Since Juliet is an experienced cyclist, she could gen-
erate knowledge of answers to the question of how to cycle in these situations, meaning
that, relative to this set of worlds, it is true to say that she knows how to cycle. However,
the default set of worlds associated with an ability ascription (2) is plausibly something
like worlds that are like the actual world. When we are interested in whether someone
can do something, we want to know whether they are in a position to do something in
the actual world. Relative to the actual world, Juliet will not succeed in cycling, because
she has not yet learnt how to cycle with prostheses. When someone utters a sentence
like (2), it is natural to accommodate and consider the set of worlds that make that sen-
tence come out true; so, even when claims (1) and (2) occur in the same sentence, it
will be natural to shift the context mid-sentence, so that both come out true.
What happens when we hold context ﬁxed? Here’s a fairly clunky tool to make the
context explicit: adding a parenthetical phrase specifying the salient worlds. Consider
know how and ability claims made relative to ‘normal’ situations:
(3) Juliet knows how to cycle in normal situations where she has legs.
(4) Juliet cannot cycle in normal situations where she has legs.
20 The same point holds true for the entailment from the ability to answer to the ability to act.
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Intuitively, we judge that sentence (3) is true, and (4) is false, meaning that both the
know-how ascription and the ability claim come out true: in normal situations, Juliet
will produce answers to the question of how to cycle, and will cycle.
If we switch to consider worlds like the supposed actual situation, our judgments
switch. Consider these:
(5) Juliet knows how to cycle in non-legged situations.
(6) Juliet cannot cycle in non-legged situations.
Sentence (5) is false, and (6) is true, meaning that Juliet neither knows how nor is able.
In the actual world, she will produce neither answers to the question of how to cycle
nor successful events of cycling. If this sounds strange, consider a situation in which we
are seeking someone to compete in a para-cycling race tomorrow. In this situation, our
focus is on the actual world, and the salient way of cycling is by using prosthetics. With
this conversational background in place, it would be completely natural to assert both
‘Juliet doesn’t know how to cycle’ and ‘Juliet cannot cycle.’
5.2 Interrogative Capacities and Intellectualism
One can imagine an intellectualist who agrees with much of what I said in section 2 about
the importance of capacities to answer question, but who maintains that knowledge-how
is a species of propositional knowledge. Yes, they say, capacities to answer questions mat-
ter to intelligent action, but these capacities are to be explained in terms of the possession
of general propositional knowledge (see Stanley [2011b: 181–4]). In general, one might
think that the interesting disagreements between intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, and
the interrogative capacity view are not about whether knowledge-how entails proposi-
tional knowledge, the ability to do, or the ability to answer, but are about the order of
explanation that connects these states [Bengson and Moffett 2011a].
Although I am sympathetic to this picture of the core disagreements in the know-
how debate, I am sceptical about whether intellectualists can explain in a satisfying way
the connection between know-how and capacities to answer on the ﬂy. The most obvi-
ous way for an intellectualist to connect propositional knowledge to the capacity to
answer questions would be to claim that among the dispositions associated with the
practical mode of presentation is the disposition to gain situation-speciﬁc knowledge.
This view faces two challenges. First, the idea of a practical mode of presentation is
pretty mysterious [Glick 2015], and it is not clear that we can get a satisfying explana-
tion of anything out of it. Second, this view would need to claim that knowledge-how
involves knowledge of a general method for V-ing that allows the knower to come to
know speciﬁc methods. However, at present there is no satisfactory account of general
methods to which the intellectualist can appeal [Hornsby 2011; Fridland 2013; Hab-
good-Coote forthcoming].
5.3 Knowledge-How and Skill
Intellectualists might instead opt to reverse the order of explanation, claiming that
knowledge-how is the kind of propositional knowledge that is produced by the ability
to answer a question. Dickie [2012] and Stanley and Williamson [2016] endorse this
kind of view, claiming that skill involves the capacity to generate propositional
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knowledge. Although at ﬁrst sight, this view looks like a relabelling of the interrogative
capacity view, I think that the views are distinct and that skill-based intellectualism
faces some important problems.
Both Dickie [2012] and Stanley and Williamson [2016] claim (i) that skill is a capac-
ity that produces knowledge, (ii) that the knowledge produced by this capacity is
knowledge-how, and (iii) that the content of this knowledge is situation-speciﬁc. They
also have a couple of important points of difference. Dickie’s works within a virtue-the-
oretic framework on which skill is a capacity to V, and the possession of knowledge of
answers to the question how to V? is to be explained in terms of the exercise of this
capacity. By contrast, Stanley and Williamson operate within a knowledge-ﬁrst frame-
work, on which a skill is a disposition to know answers. The two views also give differ-
ent roles to the propositional knowledge produced by skill. On Dickie’s view, the
intelligence of action is completely explained in terms of skill, and knowledge-how is a
mere by-product of skilled action. Stanley and Williamson give knowledge-how a more
substantial role, claiming that the situation-speciﬁc knowledge produced by skill guides
action and explains its intelligence.
These skill-based intellectualist views face two problems.
The ﬁrst problem concerns the role of knowledge-how in explaining intelligent
action. Dickie’s view makes knowledge-how into an epiphenomenal by-product of skill,
with no role to play in explaining intelligence. This view makes it difﬁcult to see why we
should care about knowledge-how. Stanley and Williamson’s account gives know-how
an explanatory role, but their model appeals to the controversial idea that the exercise
of knowledge-how always involves guidance by a propositional state. By identifying
knowledge-how with a capacity to answer questions—rather than with the product of
that capacity—and allowing a range of cases—what I above called the simple and com-
plex cases—the interrogative capacity view secures the explanatory value of knowledge-
how, whilst leaving open a range of roles for propositional knowledge. In simple cases
like knowing how to open a safe, knowledge of the answer to the question may be acti-
vated at the start of action, guiding action as it unfolds. In complex cases like knowing
how to solve a complex mathematics problem, the capacity to answer the question is
exercised in solving the problem, and knowledge of the complete answer to the ques-
tion might not arise until the problem is solved.
The second problem concerns the temporal proﬁle of knowledge-how. The follow-
ing claims ought to be common ground between skill-based intellectualism and the
interrogative capacity view: (i) that a capacity to answer a question is a standing episte-
mic state, which an agent possesses even when it is not being exercised, and (ii) that sit-
uation-speciﬁc propositional knowledge is often a transient state that an agent
possesses when she is in the relevant situation, but perhaps only for a little while after-
wards. If this is right, identifying knowledge-how with situation-speciﬁc propositional
knowledge means that an agent only possesses knowledge-how when she is in a practi-
cal situation, but not when her skill is not being exercised. This is absurd: a skilled
swimmer still knows how to swim when she is lying on the sofa, recovering from a
tough morning session.21 By identifying knowledge-how with the underlying capacity
to answer questions, the interrogative capacity gives the correct result: that knowledge-
21 Stanley and Williamson might bite the bullet on the transience of knowledge-how by claiming that all knowl-
edge-how ascriptions are habituals. Although some know-how ascriptions are habituals, it is implausible that all
are (see note 18).
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how is a standing epistemic state that is possessed even when the agent is not engaged
in the relevant kind of action.22
5.4 Is ‘On the Fly’ Mysterious?
To pick out the kind of ability to answer a question that is plausibly identiﬁed with
knowledge-how, I appealed to the idea of an ability to answer a question on the ﬂy. One
might think that this puts the interrogative capacity view in the same boat as the intel-
lectualist who appeals to practical modes of presentation: both appeal to some mysteri-
ous notion to pick out a practical species of a genus that is not intrinsically practical.
The charge would be appropriate if I had just appealed to some vague idea of
answering a question ‘on the ﬂy’ to pick out the relevant kind of ability to answer a
question. This would leave ‘on the ﬂy’ as an unexplained placeholder for the interesting
practical properties of knowledge-how. However, this is not the situation that we are
in. In section 3, I spelled out what is distinctive about a capacity to answer a question
on the ﬂy, claiming that it is an ability to know, and giving accounts of the kinds of
questions, situations, and answering process involved. I have done better than Stanley
and Williamson, who claim that skill is a kind of disposition to know, without offering
an account of what kind of disposition skill is [Pavese 2016: 657; Riley 2017]. It might
be that I haven’t picked out the right kind of ability to answer a question, but this is an
issue of detail, rather than an issue of mystery.
5.5. Is the Interrogative Capacity View Linguistically Implementable?
So far, the discussion of the linguistic evidence has focused on the semantics of the
complement in knows-how ascriptions. However, the interrogative capacity view is
also committed to the view that ‘knows’ can sometimes pick out a certain kind of abili-
tative relation. One might worry about the linguistic plausibility of this claim, either on
the ground that the linguistic uniformity of ‘knows how’ and ‘knows wh’ ascriptions
demonstrates that ‘knows’ picks out the same relation across both constructions [Stan-
ley 2011b: 208; Bengson and Moffett 2011b: 178–80], or on the ground that this claim
requires an ambiguity theory on which ‘knows’ has both a theoretical and
practical sense [Stanley and Williamson 2001: 436–7; Bengson, Moffett, and Wright
2009: 393–4].
To get an intellectualist conclusion out of the uniformity argument, we need to rely
on the claim that ‘knows wh’ and ‘knows that’ ascriptions ascribe a theoretical state,
rather than an ability. This claim may be contested. One might think that knowledge-
wh consists in the ability to answer the question expressed by the interrogative clauses
[Masto 2010; Farkas 2016a, 2016b]. There are also various accounts of knowledge-that
in terms of ability [Kenny 1989: 108; Hyman 1999, 2015; Hetherington 2011], and one
might even think that knowledge is in general the ability to answer a question [White
1982: 29, 115–21].
With that said, I don’t ﬁnd arguments from linguistic uniformity convincing: it is
easy to ﬁnd examples of linguistically uniform constructions picking out different states
[Michaelis 2011: 262], and linguistic uniformity seems at best to be a ceteris paribus
22 For further worries about Stanley and Williamson’s view, see L€owenstein [2017: 261–6].
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consideration that will be outweighed by the substantial differences between knowl-
edge-how and knowledge-wh. Highlighting these views does demonstrate that it is pos-
sible for the interrogative capacity view to offer a unifying account of knowledge by
endorsing a general account of knowledge in terms of ability, giving anti-intellectualism
a theoretical virtue that many have thought is unique to intellectualism.
The argument from ambiguity alleges that the metaphysical claim that knowledge-
that and knowledge-how consist in different relations entails the linguistic claim that
‘knows’ is ambiguous. This ambiguity thesis is implausible: standard tests for ambiguity
do not detect two readings of ‘S knows how to V’ [Bengson, Moffett, and Wright 2009:
393–4]. The ambiguity thesis also faces a problem in explaining the fact that we can
combine how-to clauses and that-clauses within the scope of one verb. Consider this:
(7) Vide knows how to swim and that it is good for him.
Since this sentence has a reading that ascribes both knowledge-how and knowledge-
that, and involves only one instance of ‘knows’, it must be possible to pick out both
kinds of knowledge by employing only one sense of ‘knows’.
On the assumption that knowledge-that is a non-abilitative relation, this argument
poses a challenge for the Interrogative capacity view. I concede that the ambiguity the-
sis is implausible, but I contest whether the interrogative capacity view (or any anti-
intellectualist view) needs to be committed to it. As Glick points out [2011: 431–2],
someone who thinks that knowledge-how and knowledge-that involve different rela-
tions need only be committed to the claim that there are different kinds of knowledge.
‘Knows’might have a uniform semantic value that nonetheless picks out different kinds
of states. By analogy, someone who thinks that there are two kinds of memory—
episodic and semantic, say—might think that ‘remembers’ is univocal, but that there
are different kinds of remembering. According to the interrogative capacity view, a sen-
tence like (7) expresses the proposition that Vide stands in the knowing relation to both
how to swim? and that swimming is good for him. The key claim is that these two tokens
of the knowledge relation are realised by different kinds of states: one by a doxastic rela-
tion, and the other by an abilitative relation.
5.6. Does the Interrogative Capacity View Over-Intellectualise?
Knowledge-how is widespread phenomenon. People know how to read and to walk,
dogs know how to catch balls, and we might even think that AlphaGo knows how to
play Go. It is a common complaint that intellectualism over-intellectualises knowledge-
how, belying the fact that skilled agents can know how without having a sophisticated
grasp of the activity, and denying non-human animals know-how. One might worry
that, by associating knowledge-how with propositional knowledge, the interrogative
capacity view falls into the same trap.
I think that this worry is misplaced. Much of the worry about over-intellectualisa-
tion arises from the idea that propositional knowledge is associated with various episte-
mic properties that knowledge-how does not possess, such as conscious access,
linguistic expressibility, and an associated true belief [Stanley 2011b: 150–74]. The
capacity to answer questions on the ﬂy is an ability to answer through action, meaning
that it does not require conscious access or linguistic expressibility. Although a capacity
to answer on the ﬂy does produce propositional knowledge, this knowledge will
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typically be transient and implicit, meaning that it will not have the properties that are
often associated with knowledge-that, such as conscious access or linguistic expressibil-
ity. Above, I argued that a capacity to answer a how-to question is even compatible
with false occurrent beliefs about the answer to that question. I think that this view can
also offer a plausible line on non-human know-how. I think that the idea of an ability
to answer a question on the ﬂy picks out a pretty basic feature of agency that is closely
tied to the ability to form and enact plans. In so far as non-human animals and com-
puter programs can possess these basic features of agency, there is no barrier to their
possessing knowledge-how.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to enrich the space of options in the debate about the nature
of knowledge-how, opening up the possibility that knowledge-how might be an ability
to answer a question. I have defended a version of this view—the interrogative capacity
view—that identiﬁes knowledge how to V with the ability to answer questions on the
ﬂy, and argued that this view has positive features that make it preferable to standard
versions of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Along the way, I hope to have
made the case that the ability to answer practical questions on the ﬂy has an important
role in the mental economy.23
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